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International Law and Domestic Legitimacy:  
Remarks prepared for Lincoln’s 
Constitutionalism in Time of War:  Lessons for 
the Current War on Terror? 
Scott Sullivan* 
INTRODUCTION 
It is serendipitous that the bicentennial of Abraham 
Lincoln’s birth coincides with the seating of a new American 
president facing tremendous economic and national security 
difficulties.  The success of the Lincoln Presidency in concluding 
and assuring the survival of the United States from the divisions 
of the Civil War reminds us of the enormous hardships the 
American people can bear and the power of a perseverant 
president. 
The focus of this symposium on Lincoln’s Constitutionalism 
in a Time of War and this particular panel of discussants on 
Suspending Rights to Sustain Public Safety is apt.  Lincoln’s 
policies during the Civil War are perhaps most noteworthy for 
their elevation of necessity over formalism.  His political 
pragmatism asserted that no President can allow the foundation 
of the nation to crumble due to reflexive pursuit of rigid 
formalism.1  In other words, the President’s responsibility to 
faithfully execute the laws of the nation could not countenance a 
world in which, when referencing habeas corpus protections, “all 
the laws, but one, to go unexecuted, and the government itself go 
to pieces, lest that one be violated.”2  Under Lincoln’s doctrine, no 
law would morally be held as preeminent when the fabric of the 
nation is at risk of being pulled asunder.  In comparison to many 
of the rather drastic measures taken during the Civil War, the 
policies of the Bush Administration appear tame and 
unobjectionable.  I presume that Professors John Yoo and 
 
* Assistant Professor of Law, Paul M. Herbert Law Center, Louisiana State 
University.  This essay reflects remarks made at the 2009 Chapman Law Review 
Symposium: Lincoln's Constitutionalism in Time of War: Lessons for the Current War on 
Terror? 
 1  See Abraham Lincoln, Message to Congress in Special Session (July 4, 1981), in 
THE COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 421, 430–31 (Roy P. Basler ed., 1953). 
 2  Id. at 430. 
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Kyndra Rotunda will assert arguments that, in comparison to the 
measures of President Lincoln, the comparatively subdued 
nature of Bush Administration policies should be left unmolested 
by the courts and accepted by the populace as similarly necessary 
measures justified by a terrorist threat that killed over 3,000 
people on September 11 and continues to hang over our shores. 
I am sympathetic to these assertions.  Many of the 
substantive elements of the Bush Administration’s response to 
September 11 were not, in and of themselves, objectionable.  The 
reality, however, is that despite the nature and magnitude of the 
threat of terrorism, the policies that have come to represent the 
cornerstones of President Bush’s execution of the war on terror 
have been repudiated—not only by the courts—but they have 
been repudiated by our allies abroad and our population at home. 
I intend to use my contribution to this symposium to reflect 
on the interplay between domestic policies in armed conflict and 
the international legal regulations promulgated under 
international law relative to the ability of the state to have its 
policies viewed as “legitimate” by its population and 
international allies. 
I.  THE POWER AND PROCESS OF LEGITIMATION 
Lincoln’s execution of the Civil War demonstrated little 
patience with legal niceties that could potentially impede his 
prosecution of the war effort.3  Some of Lincoln’s most 
controversial acts include unilaterally suspending habeas corpus 
rights in parts of the Confederacy,4 engaging in military action 
that was unsanctioned by Congress,5 embracing the concept of 
total war that led to the burning of Atlanta by General 
Sherman’s troops,6 and ordering a military blockade in the 
absence of congressional authorization.7 
Critics argued that each of these acts violated the laws of the 
United States and core principles of separation of powers that 
vested particular foreign affairs powers, such as the power to 
declare war, and, more implicitly, the judgment to suspend 
 
 3  See MARK E. NEELY, JR., THE FATE OF LIBERTY: ABRAHAM LINCOLN AND CIVIL 
LIBERTIES 11–12 (2001). 
 4  Curt Bentley, Constrained by the Liberal Tradition: Why the Supreme Court Has 
Not Found Positive Rights in the American Constitution, 2007 BYU L. REV. 1721, 1745 
n.120 (2007) (“For example, Abraham Lincoln unilaterally suspended the Writ of Habeas 
Corpus, ignoring Justice Taney's decision in Ex parte Merryman, 17 F. Cas. 144 (1861), 
during the Civil War.”). 
 5  LOUIS FISHER, PRESIDENTIAL WAR POWER 38 (1995). 
 6  Major Jeffrey F. Addicott, Operation Desert Storm: R. E. Lee or W. T. Sherman?, 
136 MIL. L. REV. 115, 122–23, 128–29 (1992). 
 7  FISHER, supra note 5, at 38. 
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habeas corpus during certain emergencies.8  Despite these 
critiques his presidency progressed with the unmistakable air 
that despite legal uncertainty, or even Constitutional violation, 
the preservation of the Union was a goal of sufficient importance 
to override any particular provision of law.9  This doctrine was 
justified by the administration as one of “necessity” that if not 
authorizing power to the President beyond the scope of the 
Constitution, at least provided substantial bend to Constitutional 
prerogatives in times of national emergency.10 
The rights-restricting actions imposed during the ongoing 
war on terror have been much more restrained than that of the 
Civil War.  Unlike Lincoln’s broad grants of power to military 
commanders to suspend habeas corpus as they saw fit, there has 
been no suspension of the right of habeas corpus.11  The detention 
facilities at the U.S. Naval Station at Guantanamo Bay compare 
quite favorably to the harsh treatment and occasional summary 
execution suffered during the Civil War.  Similarly, President 
Bush has received Congressional authorization for each major 
military operation in which his administration engaged, despite 
his clear belief that such assent is Constitutionally 
unnecessary.12 
In such light, it is curious that Benjamin Wittes represented 
mainstream sentiment, both domestically and abroad, when he 
stated before the Senate Judiciary Committee that, “[a] few years 
ago in the winter of 2002, almost nobody doubted . . . that the 
United States is entitled to detain enemy forces in the war on 
terrorism.  Today, doubt concerning the legitimacy of war on 
terrorism detentions is more the norm than the exception.”13 
 
 8  See Paul Finkelman, Civil Liberties and Civil War: The Great Emancipator as 
Civil Libertarian, 91 MICH. L. REV. 1353, 1358–60 (1993) (reviewing MARK E. NEELY, JR., 
THE FATE OF LIBERTY: ABRAHAM LINCOLN AND CIVIL LIBERTIES (1991)). 
 9  See NEELY, supra note 3, at 235. 
 10  See Neely, supra note 3, at 12–13; Paul Finkelman, Limiting Rights in Times of 
Crises: Our Civil War Experience—A History Lesson for a Post-9-11 America, 2 CARDOZO 
PUB. L., POL’Y & ETHICS J. 25, 39–41 (2003). 
 11 The Honorable Frank J. Williams et al., Still a Frightening Unknown: Achieving a 
Constitutional Balance between Civil Liberties and National Security during the War on 
Terror, 12 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 675, 740 (2007) (“The United States Constitution 
explicitly allows for the complete suspension of habeas corpus rights during wartime, but 
the current administration recognized that the more judicious approach would be to 
delay, not eliminate the right of Article III court review.”). 
 12  Memorandum Opinion For the Deputy Counsel to The President, The President’s 
Constitutional Authority to Conduct Military Operations Against Terrorists and Nations 
Supporting Them, (Sept. 25, 2001), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/olc/ 
warpowers925.htm (noting that the President has broad constitutional power to take 
military action in response to the Terrorist Attacks on the United States on September 
11, 2001). 
 13  Improving Detainee Policy: Handling Terrorism Detainees Within the American 
Justice System: Hearing Before the Committee on the Judiciary United States Senate, 
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A. The Underpinnings of Legitimate State Action and Failings 
in the War on Terror 
The conventional wisdom that President Lincoln’s draconian 
restrictions on civil rights and infringements on Constitutional 
culture were legitimate while President Bush’s were not begs the 
question of what “legitimacy” is composed of and how it is 
derived.  Clearly, this question is enormous in its breadth and 
cannot be adequately examined in the time and space limitations 
here.  This conventional wisdom, however, is consistent with 
much of what we understand of how state actions and 
institutions gain legitimacy through collective acceptance, even 
when those actions are also considered normatively suspect. 
1.  Building Legitimacy in State Action 
In a 2005 article in the Harvard Law Review, Richard Fallon 
noted that legitimacy has three dimensions—legal, sociological, 
and moral.14  Legal legitimacy derives from decisions and state 
actions that the public views as comporting with existing law.15  
Sociological legitimacy accrues when the public views an 
institution or position of the state as “approximately or on the 
average oriented to certain determinate ‘maxims’ or rules” that 
the society acknowledges as culturally defining.16  Moral 
legitimacy differentiates itself from the others by emphasizing 
the degree to which the action of the state is intuitively 
justifiable under prevailing moral standards and is thus a 
respectable use of power.17  Despite the reliance of each 
dimension on different, although somewhat overlapping 
justification, each of these types of legitimacy share the 
characteristic that they represent a collective process of 
determination and conclusion based on the extrapolation of 
cultural norms relative to relevant social goals being pursued. 
It is important to note that the threshold a policy or 
institution must reach in terms of its legal, sociological or moral 
legitimacy is not fixed.18  Similarly, the strands of legitimacy are 
 
110th Cong. 13 (2008) [hereinafter Improving Detainee Policy] (statement of Benjamin 
Wittes), available at http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/2008_hr/detainee.pdf. 
 14  Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Legitimacy and the Constitution, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1787, 
1790 (2005). 
 15  Id. at 1794–95. 
 16  MAX WEBER, THE THEORY OF SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION 124 (Talcott 
Parsons, ed., A.M. Henderson & Talcott Parsons trans., 1957); Fallon, supra note 14, at 
1795–96. 
 17  Fallon, supra note 14, at 1796–1801 (describing moral legitimacy). 
 18  See generally id. at 1796–99 (discussing moral legitimacy and ideal and minimal 
theories as thresholds for such). 
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intertwined.19  Because legitimation is a collective process, state 
actions are judged relative to the collective’s baseline 
understanding of whether the policy goal and policy actor are 
worthy of societal trust in producing normatively good results 
consistent with cultural values.20  In the context of armed conflict 
and national security, this background understanding adjusts to 
society’s perception of the urgency of governmental action and 
whether the institution executing state action is acting sincerely 
in response to the public interest rather than engaging in self-
dealing. 
2.  Legitimation Failings in the War on Terror 
The dissipation of the legitimacy of the war on terror policy 
Wittes cites from 2002 to the present is unquestionably due to a 
variety of missteps relating to the substantive provisions of U.S. 
policy.21  In this vein, he argues that the Bush Administration 
“obtusely refused to tailor the detention system contemplated by 
the laws of war to the very unusual features of the current 
conflict.”22 
There is no doubt that the public’s view of a policy as being 
normatively “correct” in substance plays a great role in 
ascertaining the legitimacy Fallon describes.23  Because the 
trustworthiness of the actor (the President) is instrumental in 
society’s acceptance of state action, disclosure, debate and the 
aura of the incorporation or airing of dissenting views heightens 
the acceptability of acts otherwise contrary to other collective 
values.  Similarly, tailoring substantive policy as closely as 
possible to existing law demonstrates (real or imagined) 
adherence to previously made policy judgments that retain value 
to society. 
President Lincoln often implicitly recognized these 
limitations through his speeches and actions during the Civil 
War.  He justified deviations from existing norms by invoking a 
“necessity” defense that was underscored by the pervasive effects 
of the war on nearly every American and the procedural 
difficulties of Congressional action inherent to the time.24  
Instead of simply asserting plenary executive power over the use 
of force and the suspension of individual rights, he conceded that 
 
 19  See generally id. at 1789–94. 
 20  See generally id. at 1811, 1818, 1848–51. 
 21  Improving Detainee Policy, supra note 13, at 13. 
 22  Id. 
 23  Fallon, supra note 14, at 1795. 
 24  JACK GOLDSMITH, THE TERROR PRESIDENCY: LAW AND JUDGMENT INSIDE THE 
BUSH ADMINISTRATION 191–92 (2007). 
SULLIVAN 10/14/2009 6:45 PM 
494 Chapman Law Review [Vol. 12:489 
his actions required Congressional ratification.25  These acts of 
ratification provided external validation which made societal 
acceptance more palatable.26  In contrast, Congressional 
validation of war on terror policies was seen as an unacceptable 
divestiture of the Administration’s theory of executive power and, 
as such, a last resort only to be taken following repudiation by 
the judicial branch.27 
B. International Affairs, International Law, and the Effect on 
Legitimacy 
The legitimating value Lincoln gained through 
Congressional ratification may ultimately tell a lesson that is 
more about the value of external validation than domestic checks 
and balances.  For Lincoln, congressional ratification of imposing 
a military blockade and suspending habeas corpus was essential 
because the Constitutional text clearly invoked Congressional 
powers in those actions, even if such powers were not explicitly 
granted to the legislature.28 
In the war on terror, international law, and especially 
international humanitarian law, has played a crucial role in 
providing the previously established standards in the most 
fevered debates over detention policy and accepted means of 
interrogation.29  The primacy of international law in these realms 
is somewhat surprising given the American predisposition to 
dismiss the importance of international law generally.  In spite of 
this general attitude to such law, I believe that international law 
has acted as a cornerstone here in gauging the legitimacy of state 
action as a general matter.  This is due to the greater 
incorporation into a rights-oriented regime affecting traditionally 
domestic concerns combined with (1) its place as an external 
benchmark of executive action; and (2) the absence of 
domestically embedded rules and standards acting contrary to 
the thrust of international law. 
1.  The Transformation of International Law 
Notions of appropriate presidential fashion are not the only 
things to have changed since Lincoln’s tenure.  The substantive 
scope and nature of international law has changed dramatically 
 
 25  NEELY, supra note 3, at 8. 
 26  Id. at 29–30. 
 27  See generally GOLDSMITH, supra note 24, at 205–13. 
 28  Of course, the predominant view of the time was that the suspension of habeas 
corpus was exclusively granted to Congress as discussed in Ex parte Merryman, 17 F.Cas. 
144, 148–52 (C.C.Md. 1861) (No. 9,487). 
 29  See GOLDSMITH, supra note 24, at 39–42, 60–64, 113–14. 
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since Lincoln’s management of the Civil War.  While notions of 
the customs and practices of war figured prominently (albeit 
often pejoratively) in the Lincoln White House, these notions 
were locked in great ambiguity and considered the vestiges of 
non-analogous imports of international European conflicts of 
relatively recent vintage.30 
Debates continue to roil among academics and policy-makers 
over the proper Constitutional station of treaty and customary 
international law and the forces of compliance international law 
exerts over state action.31  Those very worthy debates are beyond 
the scope of this Essay.  However those debates might be 
resolved, the materially different perception of the legitimacy of 
the war-oriented actions of Presidents Bush and Lincoln, in part, 
seems to reflect the power of international law framework to 
organize and set the terms of the debate prior to the initiation of 
armed conflict—a framework that sets the tone by which 
legitimacy can be ascertained or denied. 
This economic integration has caused greater political 
integration that in turn has spurred greater legal integration in 
international law.32  Simultaneously, the substantive scope of 
international law has dramatically expanded to one emphasizing 
individual rights and away from traditional conceptions of 
sovereignty.33  This movement has sparked a proliferation of 
international legal restrictions that emanate from outside the 
federal government generally, and outside the Executive Branch, 
specifically.34 
The legal landscape of extra-executive forces regulating 
executive action has changed dramatically since Lincoln’s 
presidency.35  Following World War II, the United States faced 
growing mistrust of government power in the wake of Vietnam 
and Watergate.36  These led to a number of congressional actions 
more strictly regulating executive action in armed conflict and 
foreign affairs, including more stringent regulation of intelligence 
 
 30  See NEELY, supra note 3, at 139–44, 150, 234–35. 
 31  Christopher Linde, The U.S. Constitution and International Law: Finding the 
Balance, 15 J. TRANSNAT’L L. & POL’Y 305, 307 (2006). 
 32  Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Legal Integration of NAFTA Through Supranational 
Adjudication, 43 TEX. INT’L L.J. 349 (2008). 
 33  Id. at 351–52. 
 34  Id. at 357. 
 35  Michael P. Allen, George W. Bush and the Nature of Executive Authority: The Role 
of Courts in a Time of Constitutional Change, 72 BROOK. L. REV. 871, 873–76 (2007). 
 36  Richard Morin & Dan Balz, Americans Losing Trust in Each Other and 
Institutions, WASH. POST, Jan. 28, 1996, at A1. 
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gathering,37 the President’s use of force,38 federal criminal 
liability for actions of soldiers in the field,39 as well as more 
generous rules on access to federal courts under habeas corpus 
and civil suit actions.40  These restrictions were heightened by 
the proliferating growth in international law in regulating state 
behavior through the exercise of universal jurisdiction and 
international criminal prosecutions,41 which left American 
officials exposed to ambiguous legal norms and systems of 
criminal justice “not beholden to any government and a 
prosecutorial system without real political checks and 
balances.”42  As a matter of domestic law, “lawfare” was made 
more tangible by congressional actions restricting the President’s 
power over military affairs, increasing access to federal courts 
under habeas corpus and civil suit actions, and the expanding 
scope of international law regulating behavior on the 
battlefield.43 
The enforcement of the law of war during Lincoln’s 
presidency was based on reciprocity.44  As such, the nature of one 
state’s obligation under the law could expand or contract based 
on the degree of compliance honored by its enemy.45  Moreover, 
the substantive limitations imposed on a state by the customary 
international law of the time were abstract in substance, 
quintessentially international in nature, and infrequently 
enforced by penalty.46  Perhaps most importantly, the law of war, 
reflecting international law of the time more generally, 
unquestionably emphasized state restraint rather than 
individual right. 
 
 37  Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-511, 92 Stat. 1783 
(1978) (codified at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801–1863 (2006)). 
 38  War Powers Act of 1973, 50 U.S.C. § 1541 (2006). 
 39  War Crimes Act of 1996, 18 U.S.C. § 2441 (2000); see also GOLDSMITH, supra note 
24, at 64 (discussing OLC memoranda assessing the reach of Miranda rule applicability in 
Afghanistan). 
 40  Compare Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763 (1950); Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 
466, 484 (2004); and actions under the Bivens doctrine, Bivens v. Six Unknown Named 
Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1972). 
 41  Milena Sterio, The Evolution of International Law, 31 B. C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 
213, 213–14 (2008). 
 42  GOLDSMITH, supra note 24, at 62. 
 43  See William G. Hyland Jr., Law v. National Security: When Lawyers Make 
Terrorism Policy, 7 RICH. J. GLOBAL L. & BUS., 247, 249–50 (2008). 
 44  Diane Marie Amann, Punish or Surveil, 16 TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 
873, 878–79 (2007). 
 45  See Sean Watts, Reciprocity and the Law of War, 50 HARV. INT’L L.J. 365, 368–71 
(2009) (for a discussion of the general principles of reciprocity). 
 46  See generally Robert Fabrikant, Lincoln, Emancipation, and “Military Necessity”: 
Review of Burrus M. Carnahan’s Act of Justice, Lincoln’s Emancipation Proclamation and 
the Law of War, 52 HOW. L.J. 375, 388–90 (2009) (for a discussion of the international law 
of war at the start of the Civil War) (book review). 
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Contemporary international law triumphs rights over 
encouraging restraint.47  While customary international 
humanitarian law in Lincoln’s era provided protection to 
noncombatants such as women,48 children49 and the elderly,50 
these protections were not intrinsic to the person, but reflective 
of institutional values of the aristocracy and organized religions 
of the day.51  International humanitarian law of the time was 
also considered irrelevant in matters considered domestic in 
nature and thus subject to the internal sovereign order of the 
state.52  This externally oriented view of international law norms 
has likewise given way to an atmosphere in international law 
that all that is domestic is also international.53  A shift toward 
regulating internal as well as international activity has 
permeated the regulation of international humanitarian law as 
well.54 
The development of a rights-oriented focus of international 
humanitarian law is due, in large part, to the continuing 
proliferation of rights-based treaties and doctrines including the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) as 
well as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.55  The 
drafting, interpretation and scholarship that have surrounded 
the growing structure of human rights law has encouraged a 
growing “parallelism between norms, and a growing measure of 
convergence in their personal and territorial applicability.”56  
Common Article 3 of the Conventions affords rights to 
individuals in non-international armed conflict.57  Similarly, 
Article 2(7) of the U.N. Charter acts to ensure that matters 
within states’ domestic jurisdiction shall not prejudice the 
application of enforcement measures within the U.N. structure.58 
 
 47  Phil C.W. Chan, The Legal Status of Taiwan and the Legality of the Use of Force 
in a Cross-Taiwan Strait Conflict, 8 CHINESE L.J. 455, 488 (2009) (noting that “the 
protection of human rights is a chief imperative of contemporary international law”). 
 48  Theodor Meron, The Humanization of Humanitarian Law, 94 AM. J. INT’L L. 239, 
242 (2000). 
 49  Id. 
 50  Id. 
 51  See generally Theodor Meron, Francis Lieber’s Code and Principles of Humanity, 
36 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 269 (1997) (for a discussion of humanitarian law during the 
Civil War). 
 52  Meron, supra note 48, at 247. 
 53  Id. 
 54  Id. at 247–48. 
 55  Brian Barbour & Brian Gorlick, Embracing the ‘Responsibility to Protect’: A 
Repertoire of Measures Including Asylum For Potential Victims, 20 INT’L J. REFUGEE L. 
533, 537 (2008). 
 56  Meron, supra note 48, at 245. 
 57  Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 3, Aug. 12, 
1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135. 
 58  Meron, supra note 48, at 247; U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4. 
SULLIVAN 10/14/2009 6:45 PM 
498 Chapman Law Review [Vol. 12:489 
The expanding scope and transformation of the underlying 
premise of international law from organizing state action to 
protecting human rights has altered the way in which states 
react to international law as a guidepost in determining state 
policy and behavior.59  As related to the war on terror, the 
Geneva Conventions have taken center stage in the tension 
between international law and U.S. policy.60 
2.  Geneva as a Touchstone 
It is a paradox in many ways that President Lincoln is 
considered a crucial figure in the structural development and 
substantive content of the contemporary law of international 
armed conflict.  The Leiber Code, promulgated by Lincoln in 
1863, provided both one of the earliest governmental 
codifications delineating acceptable and unacceptable behavior 
and tactics by government troops, and also endorsed the broad-
based suffering of civilian populations as a byproduct of a total 
war doctrine justified under military necessity.61 
It has become a fundamental rallying cry by opponents to 
U.S. policy in the domestic and international political arenas that 
the U.S. must “follow the Geneva Conventions.”62  The belief that 
the Bush Administration has sought to circumvent the 
Conventions has led to a pervasive conclusion that the United 
States’ “take on the Geneva Conventions destroys America’s 
international reputation for the rule of law.”63 
The substantive significance of Geneva compliance is largely 
lost on the vast majority of non-academic commentators making 
this plea.  The reality is that the general population, 
understandably, does not know what the Conventions require in 
any detail.  Nor does it seem likely to me that a comprehensive 
understanding of each of the Conventions, their applicability, 
and the rights afforded to various classes of detainees would 
matter to the underlying debate.  A comprehensive 
understanding of the substantive provisions of the Conventions 
ultimately does not matter.  I suspect the cry for Geneva 
Conventions compliance represents two broader understandings 
that are viewed as crucial to the American public: (1) the 
 
 59  See generally Chan, supra note 47, at 488. 
 60  Jonathan F. Mitchell, Legislating Clear-Statement Regimes in National-Security 
Law, 43 GA. L. REV. 1059, 1076–77, 1093–99. 
 61  Charles A. Flint, Challenging the Legality of Section 106 of the USA PATRIOT 
Act, 67 ALB. L. REV. 1183, 1190 (2004). 
 62  Faiz Shakir, Fox Guest: We Should Ignore McCain Since He ‘Was So Traumatized’ 
By P.O.W. Experience, THINK PROGRESS, Sept. 19, 2006, http://thinkprogress.org/ 
2006/09/19.damato/. 
 63  Thomas P.M. Barnett, The State of the World, ESQUIRE, May 1, 2007, at 108. 
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Conventions represent the presence of defined extra-executive 
checks on executive action; and (2) failing to comply with the 
Conventions is viewed as the repudiation of a previously made 
commitment to other nations. 
Beyond the domestic base, however, is the fact that much of 
the domestic legal debate has unfolded within the framework of 
international law, that U.S. policies at home and abroad violated 
such law, and that U.S. population and the international 
population found such violations as highly objectionable. 
The belief that the U.S. was acting in violation of 
international law not only affected the perception of U.S. policy, 
but also materially affected the ability of the nation to sew 
together a sturdy and cohesive web of allies who could be relied 
upon to provide assistance in a variety of different ways. 
The influence of international law as a legitimating device 
(or, in this case a de-legitimating device) is evident through 
President Bush’s handling of the question of the applicability of 
Geneva Convention protections for individuals detained pursuant 
to the war on terror.64  Likely more than any other single body of 
law, the Bush Administration’s decision to forego adherence to 
the Geneva Conventions in favor of a more generalized promise 
to respect the “spirit” of Geneva law has drawn criticism by both 
the American and global population. 
The decision to forego a structural commitment to the 
Conventions in favor of a spiritual one implied that the details of 
the protections encompassed therein were not only unimportant, 
but also needed to be discarded in order to pursue the effective 
prosecution of the war on terror. 
II.  SOME POSSIBLE LESSONS ON A ROLE FOR INTERNATIONAL LAW  
During the Civil War, President Lincoln’s policies were 
patently clothed in the threat of the dissolution of the nation.65  
The Constitutional doctrine that flowed from this obvious threat 
was based, and accepted, on a premise of necessity that was 
understood by the populace, even when the resulting policies 
were unpopular.66  The war on terror does not share these 
characteristics.  The threat to America is not only foreign to our 
 
 64  See Sharon Kehnemui Liss, Bush:Gitmo Prisoners Protected by Geneva 
Conventions, FOX NEWS, Jun. 9, 2005, http://www.foxnews.com/story/ 
0,2933,44169,00.html. 
 65  Michel Rosenfeld, Executive Autonomy, Judicial Authority and the Rule of Law: 
Reflections on Constitutional Interpretation and the Separation of Powers, 15 CARDOZO L. 
REV. 137, 169 (1993). 
 66  Williams, supra note 11, at 681. 
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common understandings but is also less intense in its severity.  
The latency of the threat is further complicated by the fact that 
the policies that have been created to address the terrorist threat 
are unfolding in a political culture that remains scarred by the 
increasingly routine nature of government abuses of power and 
position that have come to light over the past fifty years, not only 
as a general matter, but within the realm of national security 
concerns in particular.  These realities have placed a premium on 
building consensus, both internationally and domestically, and 
forcing the political investment of as many institutions and 
groups as possible. 
The contemporary framework of international law and 
international organizations has served as an obstacle to the 
legitimation of current U.S. policy, but also created an 
unmatched structural opportunity for President Obama to 
incorporate U.S. policy preferences into the goals, operations, and 
structures of the international system.  This can perhaps best be 
done by incorporating structural restraints on the exercise of 
U.S. power as the general rule while simultaneously opening the 
debate over the normative desirability of provisions of 
international law that he perceives as obstructing U.S. goals. 
Similarly, purveyors of international law are best served not 
by reflexive service to provisions of existing law, but through the 
advocacy of the type of structural limitations that international 
law has proven most effective—procedural safeguards and 
overarching principles of action. 
The process of public debate in the United States encourages 
an airing of policy choices that may tweak the executive’s 
proposed policy or encourage more fundamental restructuring of 
policy frameworks.  As an international matter, the incorporation 
of allies, enemies and NGOs forces recognition of an underlying 
value to a controversial policy in an attempt to stake out 
substantive grounds for the purpose of compromise.67  In both 
circumstances, the policy of the President no longer emanates 
from the executive branch alone, but creates investment among a 
group of actors that, as a consequence of that investment, creates 
legitimacy. 
 
 67  This policy movement among allies and NGOs is evident in recent discussions as 
to the approach of the Obama Administration’s approach to future of the detainees at 
Guantanamo Bay.  See Scott Shane, Mark Mazzetti & Helene Cooper, Obama Reverses 
Key Bush Policy, but Questions on Detainees Remain, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 23, 2009, at A16. 
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A. Consensus Building and International Dialogue 
The conflict between exercising unilateral power and 
engaging in a consultative process is, at heart, playing out the 
tension between exercising the discretion that attaches to 
unilateral power against the intrinsic constraints that 
accompany seeking approval from other parties.  In resolving this 
tension, the executive branch sacrifices discretion to some degree 
each time it pursues external approval.  Similarly, presidential 
policies are vulnerable to the external challenge of illegitimacy 
when the foundation of those policies is exclusively the unilateral 
power of the President.68  This give-and-take represents a core 
element of many commentators’ critiques of the Bush 
Administration’s failure to engage in consultation and consensus 
building.69  Instead of integrating legal constraints into a broader 
framework of war policy, the Administration “chose to push its 
legal discretion to its limit, and rejected any binding legal 
constraints.”70 
Working within international law affecting security policy 
encourages the executive branch to engage in its policy decision-
making and execution in as transparent a manner as possible 
and justifies such actions in public in order to preserve 
underlying policy goals that might otherwise be compromised. 
Moreover, the incorporation of international law does not 
preclude legislative override where necessary. The last-in-time 
doctrine enables the political branches to supersede international 
law through the passage of contradictory federal legislation.71  
The formal incorporation of Congress through such a process 
fosters public debate both domestically and internationally, and 
also provides incentive for the legislature to come off the sideline 
to place preferred policies on solid legal footing.  Regardless of its 
success or failure, the process of forming legislation and engaging 
in the political machinations that surround prospective 
legislation encourages a broader public dialogue as well as a focal 
 
 68  As a doctrinal matter this concept is a rough corollary of judicial assessment of 
the constitutional validity of executive action in Youngstown.  See Youngstown Sheet & 
Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 582 (1952) (holding a violation of Presidential authority 
based on an external constitutional challenge). 
 69  See, e.g., Lawmakers react to Miers’ withdrawal, CNN, Oct. 27, 2005, 
http://www.cnn.com/2005/POLITICS/10/27/miers.reax/index.html (quoting Senator 
Charles Schumer from New York suggesting Bush should take his time “carefully with 
real consultation and real consensus. One of the reasons for this problem–this mistake–is 
that there was no real consultation.”). 
 70  GOLDSMITH, supra note 24, at 119. 
 71  Justin C. Danilewitz, The Ties That Bind: U.S. Foreign Policy Commitments and 
the Constitutionality of Entrenching Executive Agreements, 14 J. TRANSNAT'L L. & POL'Y 
87, 91 (2004). 
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point for discussion of policy issues upon which debate can 
unfold.  The focal points of such debates tend to revolve around 
legislation that sparks the greatest public concern and reflects 
positions centered on popular understanding of the “most 
important” points surrounding the issue. 
Invitation for public debate in the policy-making process 
enables dissenting views to voice opinions and air grievances.  
More broadly, incorporating the public into the debate acts as a 
functional and productive way to curb the vitriol of dissent—
which perceives itself as unduly marginalized and unjustly 
silenced in affecting the actions and direction of government.  
Public inclusion in the broader policy judgments of war and 
armed conflict not only enables public opinion an outlet and 
opportunity for enhanced focus but also encourages public 
investment in the policy outcome that is ultimately embraced at 
the conclusion of the process, even if that outcome reflects a 
decision against the passage of any legislation. 
B. Extra-Executive Structural Regulations 
International law provides a substantive framework for 
many of the types of legal difficulties that occur frequently 
among nations but are typically under-examined in the domestic 
legal context.  In such circumstances, international law can 
provide the structural design to move the executive toward 
consensus building through constraints that guard against the 
intrinsic temptation of the executive branch to maximize its own 
power at the potential cost of losing its credibility.  Where norm 
vacuums exist in sorting out the law as a domestic matter, 
international law often provides a basic substantive framework 
around which more extensive law can be built domestically. 
These structural and touchstone characteristics of 
international law assist the public in assessing, and accepting, 
final provisions of law carried out in policy.  Specifically, 
incorporating international law in the domestic process (1) 
promotes international and domestic political dialogue; (2) 
encourages the executive branch to engage in formal and 
informal justification of its policies; and (3) incentivizes 
transparency through public disclosure. 
The importance of structural limitations surrounding 
executive action is demonstrable in the discussion surrounding 
the treatment of prisoners at Guantanamo Bay.  Addressing the 
issue of the standard of treatment of U.S. detainees, President 
Bush asserted that the U.S. would treat detainees “humanely 
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and, to the extent appropriate and consistent with military 
necessity . . . .”72  The power of this statement as a force of 
legitimation, is compromised by the fact that “it was very vague, 
it was not effectively operationalized into concrete standards of 
conduct, and it left all of the hard issues about ‘humane’ and 
‘appropriate’ treatment to the discretion of unknown officials.”73 
Even setting aside the question of ambiguity in determining 
core terms such as “humane” and “appropriate,” the President’s 
statement fails on an even more fundamental level.  The failure 
to effectively operationalize questions of treatment implies that 
the President’s commitment is being less than fully absorbed by 
lower officials, but the failure reaches beyond that.  It is the 
failure of any extra-executive check on the formulation of the 
policy, and a total lack of observable way to ensure that the 
overarching policy statement is being implemented, that dooms 
the President’s assertion to face endless scrutiny and skepticism. 
CONCLUSION 
My characterization of international law as a device that 
facilitates sociological legitimacy of policy decisions relative to 
the war on terror is simply to note that the key position 
international law compliance has taken in the ongoing debate 
over national security law issues.  American history is rife with 
examples of the importance of international affairs in major 
domestic policy determinations.  What makes the ongoing war on 
terror so interesting is the expansive manner in which 
international law has guided the manner in which these 
important domestic decisions are discussed, digested, and 
weighed as a domestic matter—and how that process has 
transpired with little handwringing over the validity or relevance 
of international law writ large. 
 
 72  George W. Bush, Memorandum on Humane Treatment of Taliban and al Qaeda 
Detainees, (Feb. 7, 2002), http://www.pegc.us/archive/White_House/ 
bush_memo_20020207_ed.pdf 
 73  GOLDSMITH, supra note 24, at 120. 
